Today, there is a new group of approaches in academic debates about religion which enjoys high popularity and engages concepts such as post-secularity, public religion, and desecularization. These approaches suppose that religion has an increasing presence in and impact on the public sphere of modern societies, including Western Europe. This paper questions these assumptions by arguing that the public presence and impact of religion is widely overstated. An excessively vast definition of religion allows these approaches to identify religion in a wide variety of phenomena in the public sphere.
1) Introduction
Public religion, desecularization, and post-secularity are the new buzzwords in the scientific study of religion. They mark a new era, perhaps a new paradigm, of academic thinking about religion. The supporters of this new trend purport that secularization theory was wrong: religion is neither disappearing nor suffering significant losses in the context of modernity. Instead, religion is as vivacious as ever. For many of these observers, the age of secularity has ended -or, in fact, never existed -while religion is resurging: even the societies of Western Europe which once served as a prime example for secularization theory are experiencing a resurgence of religion. Here, the continuing and rising presence of religion becomes particularly manifest in the public sphere, according to this view. Religion is assuming a new public role and thereby refutes the long-standing assumption of a privatization of religion. However, are Western European societies currently experiencing such a deprivatization of religion? Are we facing a new age of public religion?
In today's academia, we face an increasing debate about the public role of religion. Concepts that highlight the public presence of religion enjoy a strong popularity and an almost unquestionable status. Nevertheless, it is unclear if this popularity is due to the fact that these approaches capture the empirical reality in an authentic way or if their popularity is rather the product of a 'hype' of these concepts in academic debates about religion. This article will take a critical stance on the assumption that Western Europe is experiencing a rising presence and impact of religion in its public sphere(s). Its objective is to question public-religion-approaches and to indicate some of their central flaws. The main argument is that the presence and importance of public religion in Western Europe is generally overstated. I will support this hypothesis by presenting different arguments that critically analyze public-religionapproaches and cast doubt on their theses. The term 'public-religion-approaches' will be used in this article to refer to approaches that purport a significant and/or rising presence and impact of religion in the public sphere of modern societies.
Since public-religion-approaches refer to the presence of religion in the public sphere we should briefly define what the terms 'public sphere' and 'religion' mean. The public sphere can be defined as an open social arena in which a significant part of the population of a society participates passively-or actively. This arena (or: sphere) is dedicated to the gathering, production and distribution of information and opinions and is shaped by the presence of mass media (Gerhards and Neidhardt, 1991: 44-59 ).
Modern societies embrace a variety of public and media spheres (Dalferth, 2010: 324) .The most visible and crucial public sphere is perhaps the political public sphere. Its debates can potentially affect the whole population of a society and intermediate between the citizens of a society and its political system (Gerhards and Neidhardt, 1991) . Public-religion-approaches often refer to this sphere, in which they posit a significant and/or rising presence of religion. Another definition that would be necessary here is a definition of religion. However, as we will see later, a central criticism in this article regards the absence of an appropriate definition in publicreligion-approaches. To overcome this flaw, I will propose a rather classical and limited definition specifying religion as communications and/or practices referring to a supernatural reality.
The article is structured in the following way: it begins with a brief overview of the evolution of the academic debate about public religion. After this follows a section dedicated to the description of public-religion-approaches. In this section I will discuss some of the current studies and outline the common assumptions of public-religionapproaches. The next section presents my criticism of public-religion-approaches which is divided into seven points. The article ends with a short conclusion, summarizing the argument.
2) The evolution of the secularization-debate: From the 'disappearance of religion' to the 'resurgence of public religion'
The secularization thesis once constituted the most accepted and undisputed concept in the study of religion. It dominated academic debates about religion until the 1970s (Stark and Finke, 2000: 57-79) . In the context of the secularization debate, the early Peter L. Berger (1990 Berger ( [1967 ) and Thomas Luckmann (2000 [1960 ) were those who highlighted the privatization of religious belief. Peter L. Berger hypothesized that by means of socio-economic development, religion would be crowded out from the public sphere. The private sphere would remain the last sphere available for religious practice: religion would become a private issue (Berger, 1990 (Berger, [1967 : 127-53). Thomas Luckmann (2000 Luckmann ( [1960 ) added to the idea of religious privatization while rejecting the idea of secularization at the same time. Instead of asserting a decline of religion, he assumed that religion would just become 'invisible'. According to Luckmann, the social appearance of religion had been altered in modern societies and was now often hardly recognisable as religion. Religion was not disappearing or declining but just changing its form and becoming more individual and private. (Luckmann, 2000 (Luckmann, [1960 (Luckmann, ], 1996 .
According to this new thesis, religion would be banned from the public sphere and confined to the almost invisible private sphere of individuals. The practice of religion would become more and more a matter of private choice and cease to have any effect on the public sphere (See also Wilson, 1977: 176) . This was the so-called 'privatization-thesis' of religion which redefined the secularization theory and became a mainstream position in the study of religion. In contrast to the classical secularization thesis, supporters of the 'privatization' thesis supposed a privatization of religion but not necessarily a decline in the individual practice of religion.
The dominance of the privatization thesis was challenged by the pioneering work of José Casanova (1994) . In his ground-breaking book, 'Public Religions in the Modern World', Casanova subdivided the secularization thesis into three different hypotheses: (1) the functional differentiation of secular spheres from religion, (2) the decline of religious practice and belief, and (3) the privatization of religion. It was the third hypothesis, the privatization-thesis, which he tried to refute in this work. Instead of an advancing privatization of religion, Casanova supposed that in many modern societies religion would still assume a public role. Moreover, a deprivatization of religion might even be taking place in many societies (Casanova, 1994: 41) . He defined deprivatization in the following way:
'By deprivatization I mean the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them.' (Casanova, 1994: 5) According to this view, the privatization of religion was not a necessary imperative of modern societies. In many cases religion maintained its public function and refused to be confined to a marginal, private role. In some cases religion might even assume a new and enhanced public role (Casanova, 1994: 39,215) .
With the publication of 'Public Religions in the Modern World', Casanova coined the term 'public religion'. The term refers to religion or religious organizations participating effectively in the public sphere of modern societies. The idea of public religion became increasingly salient in scientific debates and marked the beginning of a new discourse about religion in modern societies. Despite this success, Casanova has made several changes to his approach since the 1994 publication of his seminal work.
He reacted to criticisms -that charged him with Western-centrism and methodological nationalism -by assuming a more global perspective and arguing that the predominant concept of secularization is mainly a Western European ideology (Casanova 2003 (Casanova , 2006 (Casanova , 2008 (Casanova , 2011 . At the same time, he maintained his general assumption of a deprivatization of religion and even extended the argument in two ways. First,
Casanova became more open to the idea of religion acting in the political sphere. While he was keen to limit public religions in his earlier work to the domain of civil society, he states in his more recent publications that the presence of religion in the political public or even the state may not necessarily contradict the requirements of democratic politics. Second, he assumes a clearer position with regard to the case of Western Europe where he witnesses a rising presence of religion in the public sphere (Casanova 2006 (Casanova , 2008 .
At least two other authors were crucial for promoting the idea of a resurgence of religion in politics and public affairs: Samuel P. Hunthington (2003) and the late Peter Berger (1999) . In his 'Clash of Civilizations' Samuel P. Hunthington (2003) identified religion as a key factor for the presumed clash of different cultures. However, his general argument about the clash of civilizations was treated with scepticism among scholars of religion. Instead, the ideas of the late Peter Berger were more openly received in the academic discipline. Berger refuted his previous privatization thesis and argued in 'The Desecularization of the World' that the 'world today (..) is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more than ever.' (Berger, 1999: 2) Authors like Casanova shifted the academic debates about religion to a new direction toward a new paradigm, a paradigm which would declare the death of secularization theory and proclaim a rising public importance of religion in late modernity. Today's academic discourse about public religion is a transdisciplinary one in which different academic fields such as sociology, political and religious sciences, theology and philosophy participate Moore 2006, Meyer 2006b ). Although the contributions may draw on different disciplinary backgrounds, they all have at least one thing in common: they refer to the presence of religion in the public sphere of modern societies. Therefore, I will group them under the umbrella term 'public-religionapproaches'. The assumptions and hypotheses of public-religion-approaches vary according to the particular theory. But we can identify common assumptions:
• Religion can be empirically found in the public sphere of modern, Western societies.
• There is a persistent -or even rising -presence of religion in the public sphere of modern, societies.
• Religion has a significant -and/or increasing -impact on public debates.
These assumptions characterize -with some variation -what I define here as publicreligion-approaches. This characterization forms a generalization which implies that the description and the following arguments do not correspond to every contribution to the debate about public religion. The aim of this article is not to create an exhaustive description of the variety of public religion approaches, but to point to some frequent flaws in the debate about public religion in the Western European context. Although some of the arguments could also be raised with regard to the general debate about public religion, the arguments in this article will draw particularly on contributions assuming a rising presence of religion in Western Europe's public.
One can classify public religion approaches that refer to Western Europe into roughly three 'camps': first, approaches witnessing and welcoming a new presence of religion in Europe`s public; second, approaches describing a new presence of religion without assuming a normative position; and third, a very small camp of approaches viewing the impact of public religion on Europe's democracies critically. In the following, I will mention some examples for each camp.
The most famous author from the first camp is Jürgen Habermas (2001 Habermas ( , 2005 Habermas ( , 2006 Habermas ( , 2008 . He argues that a new age, the age of post-secularity, has begun. Previously vastly secularized societies, like the highly developed countries of Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, would experience a new awareness of religion and attribute a new public role to religion. From now on, religion would constitute a relevant dialogue partner in the public debates of these societies (Habermas, 2008) . Moreover, Habermas presents a normative argument about public religion: he recommends that post-secular societies should facilitate religious contributions to the public sphere. Religious reasoning could contribute to public debates about the ethical values of contemporaneous and future societies. Habermas believes that modern societies might find some answers to the moral questions of our time by listening to religion in public debates (Habermas, 2001 (Habermas, , 2005 (Habermas, , 2006 (Habermas, , 2008 . A similar position to that of Habermas is proposed by Leclerc (2001) and French sociologist Willaime (2004a Willaime ( , 2004b Willaime ( , 2005 Willaime ( [1995 : [76] [77] [78] 2008 ). Willaime observes that even the highly secularized public and political sphere of France is exhibiting a new, more open attitude towards religion.
The hypersecularity of France would stimulate a restructuration process of religion.
According to Willaime, religion can form an important resource for public debates and be engaged in the identity construction process of individuals and collectives.
Contributions from this camp emphasize the positive role that religion can play as a discursive resource in public debates of (post-secular) societies.
The second camp assumes a more descriptive perspective by observing and explaining the supposed presence of public religion in Western Europe. The most prominent example of this camp would be, of course, José Casanova. Another famous sociologist of religion who addresses the topic of public religion in her recent work is Grace Davie (2006a Davie ( , 2006b . She believes that the immigration of individuals from different parts of the world has put the European model of secularization into question.
While the European secularization model advances the privatization of religion, many of the 'newcomers' have different ideas with regard to the appropriate place of religion in society. Consequently, Europeans do not only have to launch debates about the public role of religion, but religion also becomes increasingly present in Western Europe`s public:
"[r]eligion will increasingly penetrate the public sphere, a tendency driven largely by the presence of Islam in different parts of Europe." (Davie 2006a: 33) Two further examples for this camp are Koenig and Eder. Koenig (2008) argues that religion has gained a new presence and vitality in the public in the context of the European unification process. According to him, the process of European integration is resulting in a new, privileged role of religion in the European public. Klaus Eder (Eder, 2002; Bosseti and Eder, 2006) supposes, similarly to Habermas, the existence of a process of 'post-secularization'. Post-Secularization, according to Eder, means that religion is becoming more and more public and less private. He supposes that religion is returning to the public sphere in Western Europe. Although the authors from this camp generally assume a descriptive perspective, they tend in some occasions toward positions similar to that of the first camp by pointing to the positive potential of religion. Meyer (2006a Meyer ( , 2006b Meyer ( , 2006c Meyer ( , 2008 , Moore (2006), Mörschl (2006) , Philpott (2007) , Riesebrodt (2001) , Vries, Sullivan, and Ward (2008), Ward (2006) , Ziebertz and Riegel (2010) ). These contributions form part of an increasing academic debate which circulates around the idea of public religion. None of these studies questions critically if there is indeed a significant or rising presence of religion in the public sphere of modern Western societies.
The existing and still rising number of publications concerning public religion illustrates that Casanova's ideas have become a popular concept in the academic debate about religion. Today, the concept of public religion is perhaps the most 'trendy' approach in the scientific discourse about religion. Criticism of the idea of public religion is rare, if not absent. One exception is perhaps Dalferth (2010) , who points out that post-secular societies are indifferent towards religion instead of being religious or secular. 
4) A critical stance on public-religion-approaches
In this section I will critically analyze public-religion-approaches. The principal argument is that public-religion-approaches overstate the presence and impact of religion in the public sphere of modern societies, particularly Western Europe.
The argument is divided into seven points. I start by stressing the fact that most public-religion-approaches lack an explicit definition of religion. In the second point, I
try to detect the implicit definition of religion in these approaches. It turns out that public-religion-approaches utilize excessively wide and vague definitions of religion.
Therefore, I will raise a more restricted definition of religion. Based on the new definition, I will discuss in the following points the absence of religious reasoning in public communication and the fact that religion in the public sphere of Western European societies is an exceptional case which is reserved for specific contexts.
Finally, I will describe how these approaches create a myth of past secularity.
a) The absence of a definition of religion
Most public-religion-approaches lack an accurate definition of religion. What these approaches mean by referring to public religion remains an open question since they do not provide an explicit definition of religion. They do not clarify which social phenomena are of a 'religious nature' and which phenomena are not. Thus, they can potentially declare a variety of different phenomena in the public sphere as religion. The absence of an explicit definition may be partly due to the often cited difficulties to define religion. Many scholars of religion suppose that it is mostly or even totally impossible to define religion in an appropriate way (cf. Matthes 1992 Matthes , 1993 Smith 1982 , Tennbruck 1993 ; see for a critical discussion of this debate Riesebrodt 2007).
But even so, social scientists should at least roughly declare what their subject of study is and what general characteristics it has. This is even more important when the basic argument is that there is a significant presence of a phenomenon X in a specific social sphere. To prove that there is X in this sphere, we will have to outline what X is beforehand. The omission of a definition of X will necessarily lead to arbitrary judgements about the presence of X. This is today the case in the academic debates about public religion. The fact that religion is not defined facilitates its detection everywhere scholars regard it as useful for their own observations. The 'identification' of religion in the public sphere becomes an arbitrary act. The implicit concept of religion which is held by public-religion-approaches is an excessively 'wide' one which renders it impossible to distinguish religion clearly from other types of communication and practice. 4 Applying the term 'religion' to a variety of social phenomena -which are hardly of a 'religious nature' -allows the supporters of public-religion-approaches to diagnose an unprecedented presence of religion in the public sphere of modern societies. Hence, the new visibility of religion seems to be less due to a change in the empirical reality than to a broadening of the definition of religion.
In order to determine if religion has a significant presence in the public sphere of modern societies, it is necessary to apply an appropriate definition of religion. We need a clear and limiting definition which enables us to distinguish between religious and non-religious social phenomena in the public sphere.
One exception among public religion approaches is Birgit Meyer. Religious communication takes place when supernatural concepts such as 'hell', 'Jesus Christ', 'Satan', 'God's will' etc. are applied: an evangelical pastor publicly saying that we must eradicate poverty because it is God's will or claiming that homosexuality is the work of satanic forces would be examples of public religion.
Therefore religious communication involves explicit references to entities that are defined as supernatural. In order to define social phenomena as religion, one would also have to take the context into account. There is a difference between the word 'God' being used in a church service and by a speaker at a sociological conference about But not only press releases also the participation of representatives of religious organizations in TV debates and radio programs appear to be rather secular. Their contributions assume generally a non-religious character. Instead of referring to the will of God, representatives of Christian churches will justify their opinion and demands with non-religious arguments. Public-religion-approaches describe public statements from religious actors as a manifestation of public religion. Their hypothesis of a persistent and rising presence of religion in the public sphere is based on the involvement of religious actors in the public sphere. But considering the way in which these actors involve in the public sphere, it seems as though their public contributions are mainly non-religious. Similarly to nonreligious actors they use non-religious communication to make contributions to public debates. Hence, it is not evident why their contributions should be classified as more religious than the contributions of other, non-religious actors in the public sphere. In the light of these observations, public religion as posited by public-religion-approaches vanishes. What remains is non-religious communication conducted by religious actors.
In addition to this point, one could scrutinize the impact of public communications emitted by religious actors. The real impact of these contributions on public debates is questionable. Regarding the example of the Archbishop of Canterbury proposing Sharia law, one could argue that even in the case that religious actors manage to communicate their arguments to a wide audience, they are often not taken seriously in public debates.
d) The secularity of the public sphere of modern, Western societies
Religious organizations, groups and individuals tend to communicate in a non-religious way in the political public sphere. Since they are primarily defined as religious actors we may wonder why they communicate in a non-religious rather than in a religious way in the public sphere.
The most compelling explanation for the secularity of their public communication is that religious actors adapt to the requirements of a secular public sphere. The political public sphere of Western-European societies can be characterized as a non-religious sphere. Religious reasoning is not literally banned from the public sphere, but it is not considered to be an appropriate form of communication in public debates.
Communications referring to the will of the supernatural, for instance, would lack any common ground and connectivity in a public political debate. There would be very little prospect for such communication to be picked up by other public agents (mass media, commentators, politicians etc.) in a serious manner.
The secularity of the public sphere is due to a wider secularization process which was prominently described by secularization theorists such as Steve Bruce (Wallis and Bruce, 1992 , Bruce, 2003 . The process of functional differentiation in Western
European societies has led to religious communication and reasoning being increasingly excluded from the political public sphere. The public sphere has become a non-religious sphere. Thus, the reasoning and logic involved in public debates are fundamentally secular and alien to religious reasoning. That does not mean that religious actors cannot try to involve themselves in the public sphere. Obviously, they participate in public debates. But they do not deploy religious concepts to do so. Religious organizations adapt to the secularity of public debates by communicating in a non-religious way.
Thereby they improve their chances of being heard and acknowledged in public debates.
Otherwise they would possibly be ignored or mocked.
Even Casanova (1994) assumes in his early work that religious organizations, in order to effectively engage in the public sphere, would have to commit themselves to the functional differentiation between religion and other social spheres. Nevertheless, the unspoken standard appears to be even more demanding by requiring religious actors to commit themselves to secular communication and to refrain from religious reasoning.
Consequently, the public sphere is a social context from which religion is widely excluded. In public debates religion can hardly be involved in a direct manner.
Nevertheless, in specific social contexts religion does seem to be a convenient mode of communication in the public sphere, as the two following points will show. But these contexts remain marginal and are of a minor impact in the public.
e) Public religion as an exceptional case
Despite the secularity of the public sphere, the modern 'ban' on public religion is not absolute. There are exceptions. Religion may become public when exceptional, incomprehensible events of major public impact occur in a society. Examples of these are major catastrophes or emotional events that can hardly be grasped in rational terms.
In these cases religion may assume a public function: by offering a ritual and a scheme of interpretation which refers to a transcendent reality, religion can help citizens to overcome the experience of such events and transform them into a more meaningful complexity. Public memorial services may, for instance, be conducted by religious organizations and broadcasted on the national television channels on such occasions. However, after such events occur, religion disappears rapidly from the public scene.
Public religion deals with exceptional events. Religion in the main areas of the public sphere is limited to these very specific contexts which enable religion to enter the public sphere for a short time. In everyday debates of the public sphere there is no place for religion. They constitute a different social context which is not accessible for religion, as described above. 
g) The myth of past secularity
Public-religion-approaches posit that there is a new presence of religion in the public sphere of modern societies. Religion is becoming more and more public. By suggesting that religion is more public than it has been before, they -directly or indirectly -create an image of a secular past in which communication from religious actors was almost or totally absent from the public sphere (Dalferth, 2010: 323) .
Especially the increasingly popular notion of 'post-secular society' suggests that there was an entirely secular age which is now replaced by a new stage of social evolution: the post-secular society. While religion was marginalized and religious actors
were not permitted to participate in the public of the secular society, the post-secular society would now assign a new, enhanced public role to religion (Habermas, 2008 Pollack, 2006) .
5) Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to raise some critical questions regarding publicreligion-approaches. Public-religion-approaches emphasize the public presence and impact of religion in modern societies. They posit a significant and/or rising impact of religion on the public sphere of modern societies, including Western Europe. However, their conclusions about a significant presence and impact of religion are based on diffuse and excessively wide concepts of religion. Applying the term 'religion' to a variety of social phenomena -which are often hardly of a religious nature -allows them to diagnose an unprecedented impact and presence of religion in the public sphere.
Using a more restricted definition of religion, many phenomena described as religion by public-religion-approaches turn out to be non-religious. Religious actors -such as religious organizations, groups or individuals -appear to prefer the use of non-religious communication when participating in the public sphere. Therefore, it is questionable that there is a rise of public religion or a major presence of religion in Western Europe's public spheres. Public religion does not appear to be a daily phenomenon: it remains rather limited to exceptional cases and contexts. Instead of becoming more and more religious, the public sphere continues to be mainly a secular sphere in which religious actors participate by conducting non-religious communication. Rather than reflecting the empirical reality, the assumption of a rise of 'public religion' seems to be merely a theoretical trend in the academic community.
The arguments raised here indicate some general flaws of public-religionapproaches and question their assumption of a significant and/or rising presence of religion on the public sphere of modern societies. However, in order to really determine the degree to which religious communication and practice does or does not play a role in the main areas of Western Europe's public spheres, a comprehensive empirical research would be necessary. Such a study should be based on a clear and limited definition of religion.
Notes
1 One of the first authors to indicate the formation of a new paradigm in the academic study of religion was Stephan Warner (1993) . The 'death of secularization' was proclaimed by Stark (1999) and Stark and Finke (2000) on the basis of their rational choice theory of religion. Although strongly related to the secularization debate rational choice theory is not directly linked to the debate about public religion since rational choice theory focuses on the second of the three secularizations hypotheses mentioned by Casanova (1994) arguing that the vitality of religious practice and belief is not related to modernization but to religious market competition.
2 Grace Davie (2009), for instance argues in an article published in The Guardian that "Europe should recall its religious heritage rather than deny it (…)" (Davie 2009 ). 3 Dalferth states: 'Thus, a post-secular state is indifferent to questions of religion or nonreligion, and not merely neutral: There may be many religions and non-religions in society, but the state does not bother to define its relations to them in a particular way.' (Dalferth, 2010: 335) 4 A positive exception among public-religion-approaches is Eder's approach since he defines religion in a more explicit way. He describes religion as communication about identity. Religion is defined by its function to construct social and individual identity by bridging between past, present and future (Eder, 2002: 9 ). Yet, his definition remains also excessively wide since there are many types of communication which can serve this purpose without necessarily being religious.
5 Meyer (2006a Meyer ( , 2008 presents some innovative research about religion and media in Ghana. Unfortunately, Meyer has so far not explored religious media in Western societies. With regard to the lack of studies about religion and media in Western Europe (Davie 2000: 104) it could result to be very fruitful for the debate about public religion to apply Meyers approach to the study of public religion in Western Europe. 6 An interesting example for this tendency gives also Schmalzbauer (2002) . He shows for the case of the US that religiously convicted Evangelical and Catholic journalists either avoid any reference to their religious convictions or translate their religious convictions into a professional, secular language which is -if at all -only very distantly related to religion. Religious language is not regarded as a suitable form of communication in the public sphere.
7 The functional perspective to religion which is mentioned here derives from
Luhmann's theory of religion. He defines the function of religion as the transformation of unknown, indefinable complexity into definable complexity by applying the religious code of transcendence (supernatural) and immanence (Luhmann, 2000) . Unfortunately, Habermas and other supporters of this idea do not clarify why the period in question was -in contrast to the current period -of a (more) secular nature.
